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C a n  S tat e S  B e  C o r p o r at e ly  l i a B l e  t o 
at ta C k  i n  Wa r ?
François Tanguay-Renaud
Introduction: States as Collectives and Liability—One 
Underexplored Starting Point
Under the influence of Jeff McMahan’s groundbreaking work, many recent 
writings in Just War theory have taken a fundamentally individualistic 
turn in their approach to the morality of war.1 It is individuals’ actions that 
make wars unjust, and it is individuals’ liability and moral value that govern 
how wars should be fought. Collectives’ existence, rights, or liability have 
no salient moral role to play, and insofar as they figure in discussions of 
the morality of war, it is merely as shorthand for deeper individualistic 
complexities. Such radical reductive individualism is generally asserted 
in reaction to a longstanding theoretical tradition according to which the 
morality of war applies primarily to the acts of collective entities—namely, 
states—and only derivatively to the acts of individuals, such that otherwise 
familiar principles of individual morality do not apply in that context.2 To 
be sure, one of the most strident rallying cries of individualist theorists 
is that traditional war doctrines that ascribe irreducible moral salience to 
1. See Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), as well 
as, for example, Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014).
2. The loci classici of this tradition include Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 
ed. and trans. Gerald Hopkins, in The Social Contract and Other Political Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), I.4.9; Michael Walzer, Just and 
Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
6
* I wish to thank Vincent Chiao, Helen Frowe, Adil Haque, Seth Lazar, Victor Tadros, 
Helga Varden, and Ekow Yankah for their comments in the context of two workshops 
where this essay was presented. I also thank the editors of this volume for their written 
comments. This research was made possible by a grant from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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states almost invariably end up overlooking crucial differences in the moral posi-
tion of individual participants in wars—including differences that stem from the 
justice or injustice of their respective causes and, among unjust participants, from 
the kind and degree of their involvement in warfare.
The appeal of this line of criticism lies primarily in its promise of greater moral 
discernment. Accordingly, theorists who champion it ought to be especially wary 
of overgeneralizations and non sequiturs. Indeed, even if traditionalist doctrines 
such as the moral equality of combatants and civilians’ absolute immunity are 
flawed and ordinary individual distinctions are as central to the morality of war 
as they are to morality more generally, it does not necessarily follow that states are 
a mere shorthand in evaluations of how wars should be fought. If one is prepared 
to hold, as many do, that at least some organized collectives, such as some com-
mercial corporations and non-governmental organizations, can make additional 
moral differences in the world—that is, moral differences that are not fully reduc-
ible to those of their individual members—why would it not also be the case 
for states? McMahan himself recognizes that “there is no reason to suppose that 
states, or any other kinds of political collectives, are fundamentally different mor-
ally from collectives that are not political in nature,” and that “the principles gov-
erning collective violence in war should be the same as those governing collective 
action in domestic contexts.”3 If that is true and, in war or otherwise, states, like 
corporations and NGOs, can, for example, engage in distinctively collective 
wrongdoing or otherwise make themselves liable to adverse actions qua collec-
tives, then a full account of the morality of war may be well advised to take such 
facts into account. That is, war theorists may have to account for this collective 
reality alongside all the complex and important individual moral distinctions at 
play. Unlike what much of traditional Just War theory and contemporary indi-
vidualist retorts would have us believe, the resulting moral picture may then be 
more, not less, complex.
My goal in this essay is to begin to investigate one salient moral difference that 
states qua group agents may intuitively be thought to make in war, assuming that 
such agents exist. My focus will be on the idea of liability to attack, central to 
much recent individualist Just War theorizing. Those liable to attack, McMahan 
contends, “would not be wronged by being attacked, and would have no justified 
complaints about being attacked.”4 This leads me to ask: insofar as states are cor-
porate group agents, might they ever intelligibly be said to be liable in this sense 
qua groups? If so, could such corporate liability ever make a difference in an over-
3. McMahan, Killing in War, 156.
4. Ibid., 8.
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all argument about the permissibility of attacking a state? In this essay, I argue 
that, if some states are indeed responsible corporate agents, the possibility of their 
liability to attack is at least intelligible and, in some cases, may be morally deter-
minative. However, I also contend that, insofar as one is committed to the prin-
ciple of value individualism (and perhaps even otherwise), cases in which state 
corporate liability is morally salient are likely to be rare and restricted to very 
specific sets of circumstances.
I take as my point of departure Christian List and Philip Pettit’s account of 
group agency,5 which, in my view, is currently the most developed and intuitively 
plausible available. The account holds, first, that groups such as states can be 
 conversable agents in their own right, in the manner of individual human beings. 
That is, they can be constituted in ways that make it possible to reason and do 
business with them over time qua groups—for example, by entering into treaties 
or contracts with them, reasonably expecting that these will be honored. For such 
conversability to be possible, the group needs, of course, to be responsive to the 
attitudes and inputs of its individual members. However, it must also be respon-
sive in a way that secures group sensitivity to reason over time, with a minimum 
of consistency and coherence. According to List and Pettit, these features can 
obtain when the group functions in keeping with an adequate normative frame-
work, or constitution. A constitution is adequate in this sense when it sets out a 
decision procedure that ensures that the organized group’s judgments, as well as 
action-directing attitudes and plans are, on the whole, functionally independent, 
as opposed to a mere reflection, of the corresponding judgments, attitudes, and 
plans of group members. Thus, autocratic decision procedures, according to 
which decisions are merely those of an individual dictator and no real group deci-
sions are taken, are clearly inadequate. In such cases, there is no conversable group 
agent—only the dictator himself.
What a constitution must ensure is the group’s relative autonomy, in the sense 
of enabling it to form judgments, attitudes, and plans that cannot fully be reduced 
to those of one or more group members. One might think of some forms of ma-
joritarian democracy in such terms. For the sake of simplicity, consider the fol-
lowing three-person example, where A, B, and C are deciding whether X&(Y&Z). 
If A believes X&(Y&¬Z), B believes X&(¬Y&Z), and C believes ¬X&(Y&Z), 
then if the group votes on each of X, Y, and Z in turn, the group will hold that 
X&(Y&Z) although none of the members believes this.
5. Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of 
Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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An additional issue arises here, as it does with other decision-making pro-
cedures for aggregating individual judgments into group judgments.6 Broadly 
stated, individual responsiveness—in my example, to the beliefs of A, B, and C—
may, over time, compromise the minimal rational consistency that we expect 
from agents proper. So, for conversable group agency to be possible, a process must 
also be in place to ensure that the group keeps track of where its accumulating 
decisions are taking it, and can respond appropriately to that information. In other 
words, balances and checks must be in place to make sure that, over time, the 
group can revise its corporate judgments so as to restore reasonable consistency.
One of the great strengths of this kind of account is that it rests on the non-
mysterious premise that group agents derive all their matter and energy from 
their individual members. It is through their individual members that organized 
groups can access evidence and gain the understanding required to make evalua-
tive judgments about the reasons for action and normative options they face. The 
overall contention, though, is that, by jointly committing and adhering to an ad-
equate constitution, group members can generate a single, relatively autonomous, 
and enduring corporate agent that, when faced with normatively significant choices, 
is capable of making irreducible and reasonably consistent judgments about how 
it should respond—about what is good and bad, right and wrong. This corporate 
agent, which in an important sense has a mind of its own, may then formulate 
objectives, make decisions, and develop strategies and plans to implement these 
over time, all in a saliently irreducible way. It may also control for the execution of 
such plans by arranging things so that some individuals are directed, or empow-
ered, to perform relevant tasks, while others are identified as possible back-ups. 
As List and Pettit argue, a corporate agent that arranges for action in this way is 
fit to be held responsible, and may appropriately be blamed, as “the source of the 
deed” or the “planner” at its origin.7 Of course, the individuals who give life to 
such an agent still have to answer for what they do in making corporate agency 
possible. They remain moral agents in their own right. However, the entity they 
maintain also has to answer as a whole for what it does at the corporate level.
As complex organizations that deal diachronically with their members as well 
as with other organizations and individuals, endure alterations in membership, 
6. In Group Agency, chaps. 2–3, List and Pettit consider various other premise aggregation pro-
cedures, sequential priority decision procedures, as well as more complex distributed premise-
based procedures among subgroups.
7. List and Pettit, Group Agency, chap. 7. For a discussion, expanding beyond List and Pettit’s 
work, of the various kinds of multilevel causal control and structural control that make group 
responsibility salient, over and above the responsibility of individual enactors, see Anders 
Strand, “Group Agency, Responsibility, and Control,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 
(2013): 201–24.
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and even changes in political regimes, modern states (or at least some of them) 
are prime candidates for long-lasting irreducible corporate moral agency and re-
sponsibility. Their constitutions typically include principles of governance, insti-
tute multilayered decision-making procedures, and impose the kinds of balances 
and checks necessary to foster relative organizational autonomy and sufficient 
rational consistency over time. Common examples of relevant decisional con-
straints include the separation of powers between the executive, the legislative, 
and the judiciary, bicameral legislatures, judicial review of administrative and leg-
islative action, stare decisis, enforceable bills of rights, elections, federal division 
of powers, constitutional conventions such as ministerial and cabinet responsibil-
ity, impeachment procedures, and the like. No doubt, modern states depend on 
their individual members to make decisions and act, but by committing and ad-
hering to their state’s constitutional framework to a reasonable extent, such indi-
viduals can bring about genuine state moral agency and responsibility. Indeed, for 
List and Pettit, states qua corporate agents may even appropriately be described 
as persons, insofar as “person” is understood in the sense of an agent capable of 
appropriately responding to reasons, and performing in the space of obligations.8
As controversial as this and previous claims may be,9 I will henceforth assume, 
arguendo, the soundness of the account to this point. That is, even if we accept 
that some states are irreducible group agents, or persons, and can be responsible 
for, say, unjust or otherwise wrongful actions and be blamed for them, can these 
states also be liable qua groups to adverse consequences? In other words, can their 
moral agency, or performative personhood, not only make them susceptible to 
judgments of responsibility and blame, as is often alleged, but also to liability, 
 including liability to attack?
I. State Corporate Liability to Attack?
a. Liability to Attack
The idea of liability to attack is central to much individualistic Just War theoriz-
ing.10 At its core lies the thought that, if one is liable to attack, one is not wronged 
8. List and Pettit, Group Agency, chap. 8. They defend this account of personhood against 
accounts grounded in phenomenal consciousness, which, they concede, would not extend 
personhood to corporate agents.
9. Jeff McMahan himself rejects them: “Aggression and Punishment,” in War: Philosophical 
Perspectives, ed. Larry May (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 67–84, at 83.
10. For an extended discussion of moral liability in this volume, see Richard Arneson, 
“Resolving the Responsibility Dilemma.” See also Jeff McMahan, “Liability, Proportionality, 
and the Number of Aggressors.”
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by it, and may not complain about it on that basis. Liability so understood is not 
a justificatory panacea: it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
permissibility of attacking someone. For example, it may be wrong to attack a 
person who is liable to it insofar as it would wrong others, who would be harmed 
as a side effect. It may also be permissible to attack those who are non-liable, say, 
as a means of preventing substantially worse harm. Still, establishing that one is 
liable to attack is a distinctive and important step in an overall argument about 
the permissibility of attacking him or her.
How is liability established? Accounts diverge. For McMahan, liability cor-
responds to the loss or, more precisely, the forfeiture of a right. A “person’s being 
liable to attack,” he contends, “just is his having forfeited his right not to be at-
tacked, in the circumstances.”11 Thus, one’s liability to attack arises through some 
action—some responsible act or omission. Usually, McMahan argues, such liabil-
ity arises through action that constitutes responsible wrongdoing—most notably, 
the responsible posing of an unjust threat of harm. Although an aggravating 
factor, culpability is not required for liability, as in the case of the homeowner 
who mistakenly threatens to shoot the identical twin of a mass murderer, known 
to break into people’s homes and kill them on the spot, when the twin brother 
shows up at his doorstep. Despite being excused for his wrongful threat, McMahan 
holds, this homeowner is liable to defensive attack. Yet liability is importantly 
not an all-or-nothing affair. For example, it would wrong a person who is morally 
responsible for an unjust threat if he or she were merely attacked for fun, or 
simply because attacking them would do more good than harm in a way that 
bears no relation to their wrong. A person is liable to attack, McMahan insists, 
only when attacking this person is necessary for the prevention or correction 
of a wrong for which the person is morally responsible, and the harm that the 
attack would cause this person is not excessive in relation to the realization of 
one of those aims. Still, in war, where unjust threats will often be to individuals’ 
lives, and be overly burdensome or impossible to avert without seriously harming 
or even killing those responsible for them, attackers may well be liable to such 
a fate.
Others, like Victor Tadros, conceive of liability more expansively. Like 
McMahan, Tadros thinks of it as tethered to preventive or corrective goals, and as 
coming with internal necessity and proportionality constraints. Still, according 
to him, the concept does not so much track the loss of rights as situations in 
which one does not have a right in the first place. The most important way in 
which one lacks a right not to be attacked for the sake of some relevant goal is, he 
11. McMahan, Killing in War, 10.
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suggests, when one has an enforceable duty to bear the harm that would result 
from the attack, for the sake of that goal.12 Assume, for example, that one has a 
duty to rescue a child drowning in a pond at a minimal cost to oneself—say, in-
curring a bad cut on one’s leg that will leave a visible scar (or perhaps even, per 
Tadros, losing a finger)—but that one is unwilling to do so. Assume further that 
the child could be rescued by throwing the unwilling person into the pond, and 
that this attack would only cause the person to incur the said minimal cost. 
Tadros argues that the unwilling person is liable to this attack. She is liable to it in 
the sense that she has an enforceable duty to rescue the child and, accordingly, has 
no right not to be harmed in this way for the sake of the child. When the stakes 
are higher, one may also be liable to much more than such a minimal cost. For 
example, Tadros contends that, were someone the only person able to save a very 
large number of lives, he may have an enforceable duty to do so at the cost of his 
life. Were he unwilling or unable to discharge this duty, he would then be liable to 
be killed as a means of saving the other lives at stake, even though he is not re-
sponsible for what is threatening them.
Culpability without responsibility can also ground liability to attack for 
Tadros. Consider the following hypothetical:
Evelyn hires a hitman to kill Wayne. Fred also hires a hitman to kill Wayne. 
Both hitmen arrive at the same time. Because of where they are standing, 
Wayne can only use Fred as a shield against Evelyn’s hitman and Evelyn 
as a shield against Fred’s hitman. He manages to do that, resulting in the 
deaths of Evelyn and Fred.13
Tadros contends that it is permissible for Wayne to use Evelyn and Fred in this 
way, given that they are both liable to it. Since Evelyn culpably chose to set her 
murderous threat in motion, she has a duty to prevent Wayne from being killed 
by it, even at the cost of her life. So does Fred. Still, by hypothesis, neither can 
discharge this duty by themselves, such that each has a derivative duty to try to get 
someone else to do it for them. Tadros argues that since each can avert the threat 
that he or she culpably created by forming and executing an agreement with the 
other, to the effect that he or she will avert the threat that the other has created, 
each has a duty to do so. If either or both are unwilling, Wayne can do to them 
what they have a duty to do. That is, he can use the two as shields to avert the 
12. See Victor Tadros, “Duty and Liability,” Utilitas 24 (2012): 259–77.
13. Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 192.
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threats that he faces even if, in so doing, he harms each of them as a means of 
averting a threat that he or she is not responsible for creating.
Tadros does not deny McMahan’s contention that one’s moral responsibility 
for an unjust threat can engender one’s liability to attack, including liability to be 
seriously harmed or even killed in the process. However, since he believes that 
 liability rests on enforceable duties to bear harm, and that such duties can be 
grounded in many other considerations than moral responsibility, his conception 
is more expansive and multifaceted. For him, considerations of beneficence 
and culpability can also ground liability to attack quite independently of con-
siderations of moral responsibility, and so might considerations of causation 
and benefit.14
Here is not the place to adjudicate between these two leading accounts of 
 liability. More would need to be said about them, and perhaps other contenders, 
before any sound verdict can be reached. Still, I believe that the two are suffi-
ciently representative to allow for a meaningful discussion of the issue of corpo-
rate (group, collective) state liability to attack.
b. The Basis for Extending Liability to Attack to States
To recap, it follows from the account of corporate agency considered that states 
that meet relevant organizational criteria can have reasons, including duties—of 
beneficence, justice, not to harm, etc.—that apply to them qua groups, and to 
which they can respond appropriately qua groups. When they fail to do so, they, 
like other moral agents, may be responsible for wrongdoing (understood as a 
breach of duty). In the context of war, such wrongdoing might include the crea-
tion of unjust threats of harm. Since, as group agents, states can make choices and 
plan for action and, in so doing, may exhibit irreducible attitudes such as inten-
tionality, recklessness, or negligence, they may even culpably give rise to such 
wrongful threats.
Moreover, it seems to follow from the account that, as corporate entities with 
goals of their own for which things can go well or badly over time—and, thus, 
which can plausibly have interests15—states may also conceivably have rights. 
They may have rights in the sense of interests sufficiently important to ground 
14. Tadros, “Duty and Liability,” 269–77; Victor Tadros, “Causation, Culpability and 
Liability,” in The Ethics of Self-Defense, ed. C. Coons and M. Weber (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016).
15. On organized group agents as interest holders, see further Rachael Briggs, “The Normative 
Standing of Group Agents,” Episteme 9 (2012): 283–91.
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duties in others.16 One common objection to this claim is that groups should 
never be thought to have any moral value prior to, or independent of, the good or 
interests of their individual members. Thus, their rights should not be ascribed 
any value per se. Assertions to the contrary, the objection typically goes on, served 
as normative entry points for some of the worst Nazi and communist atrocities of 
our times. They did so by paving the way for arguments that the corporate rights 
of groups, understood separately from those of individuals, could simply trump 
them.17 While alluring, this (rather crudely formulated) objection does not un-
dermine the possibility of morally important corporate rights that are irreducibly 
held by states. One possibility is that, though important, corporate rights, how-
ever valued, are always less stringent than individual rights, or at least less strin-
gent than core individual rights to life, against torture, not to be harmed, and 
so forth, which are characteristically at stake in war. Another possibility is that, 
while corporate rights, however valued, might at times defeat important individ-
ual rights, they did not do so, contrary to what was alleged, in the specific histor-
ical circumstances contemplated by the objection.
List and Pettit opt for a different line of argument that is more aligned with 
familiar liberal or republican commitments. They reject outright that the rights 
and interests of organized groups can ever be valued independently of those of 
individual persons. After all, they claim, such groups are merely social arrange-
ments that individuals create and maintain, through coordinated efforts, to serve 
social ends, and it would seem somewhat circular to factor in these groups’ own 
interests when assessing their value. That is, List and Pettit’s account allows for 
the possibility of corporate rights while endorsing the widely shared principle 
of value individualism, according to which the worth of corporate agents (and, 
indeed, of anything else) must ultimately be appreciated in terms of their contri-
butions to human (or, at least, sentient) life and its quality.18 Their point, I take it, 
is that to meet the common objection, an account of state corporate rights can 
make clear that the moral value and strength of these rights may only be derived 
from how they serve individuals’ good or interests—even if only in a mediated 
16. On this understanding of rights, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), chap. 7. As Raz himself recognizes, one is capable of having rights in 
this sense “if either his well-being is of ultimate value or he is an ‘artificial person’ (e.g. a corpo-
ration)” (166). Note that, unlike Raz, I do not claim here that individual human beings have 
no rights grounded in other considerations than interests.
17. See further David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
143–44.
18. List and Pettit, Group Agency, 182; Christian List and Philip Pettit, “Episteme Symposium 
on Group Agency: Replies to Gaus, Cariani, Sylvan, and Briggs,” Episteme 9 (2012): 293–309, 
at 307–8.
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and irreducible way.19 Consider the oft-discussed irreducible rights of states 
against the interference of external actors in their internal affairs, namely, their 
sovereignty rights. States plausibly have such rights, at least in part due to their 
interests in developing and seeing through their group plans. Insofar as they do 
have such rights, they also plausibly have some moral stringency. However, when 
it comes to assessing it, value individualism ought to take center stage. For exam-
ple, the rights’ stringency may be evaluated based on the desirability, for individ-
ual members, of seeing their state’s group plans realized given the importance of 
collectively organized territorial governance that is close to the governed and, in 
our morally plural world, can better reflect and support the development of valu-
able local understandings, cultures, and traditions. Furthermore, insofar as there 
are no other entities able to govern as effectively and impartially, and secure 
 important public goods such as these and others, failure to recognize states’ 
 sovereignty may be quite counterproductive for individuals. External meddling 
may result in all sorts of harmful mistakes and abuses that make things far worse 
for them.
Such theoretical refinements should go some way toward assuaging the con-
cerns of individualistic theorists who are reminded of traditional Just War theo-
rists’ “domestic analogy,” according to which states are analogous to individual 
persons, and are governed by the same moral principles as them.20 Recall, though, 
that this analogy never comes alone for Just War traditionalists. They also think 
that war occurs primarily between states, and that it is primarily morality as it 
applies to them that governs it. Consequently, individual participants in war are 
largely eclipsed from key aspects of their theories. Taking their view seriously 
seems to entail that individuals are, at most, embodiments of their states, and the 
harms they suffer are, at most, non-lethal harms to the larger collective entity. For 
individualists, a key problem with such reasoning is that, while we may intelligi-
bly say that attacks on states can wrongfully “harm them”—in the sense of violat-
ing “their rights” or otherwise setting back “their interests”—such talk is at most 
metaphorical and dangerously so. It is dangerous insofar as it is taken as a basis to 
argue that it is the rights and interests of states qua distinct persons that should be 
morally commanding in war, as opposed to those of individuals. Surely, individu-
alists counter, wartime attacks on states generally involve the killing and serious 
harming of individuals, and these facts are sufficiently important not to be disre-
garded in favor of an exclusive focus on states, or unduly discounted as mere 
19. See further Dwight Newman, Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework 
for Rights Held by Groups (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), esp. chap. 5.
20. The expression is used by Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars, 58.
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 expendable parts of them.21 I find this rejoinder compelling. If attacks on states 
are to be justified in terms of state liability, the explanation for it must give indi-
viduals’ rights and interests their due.
So, for some individualists, List and Pettit’s suggestion that states can be real, 
as opposed to metaphorical, corporate agents—even persons—with important 
irreducible duties and rights will likely trigger alarm bells. Still, the latter’s ac-
count can avoid traditionalist oversimplification. Pace List and Pettit themselves, 
it may perhaps even do so by recognizing the non-circular possibility of some 
non-individualist valuation of corporate states and their rights—some may prefer 
to speak of impersonal value.22 It may, insofar as it also clarifies how such valua-
tion can relate to individuals’ distinct rights and interests without denying them 
their proper stringency. Admittedly, the idea of impersonal collective valuation—
independent of how human lives-in-being (or, at least, sentient beings) are affected 
by the collective object of value—remains philosophically fraught, especially 
among self-proclaimed individualists. So this suggestion will likely meet significant 
resistance. Note, however, that the account can also avoid traditionalist oversim-
plification by unwaveringly holding onto the received wisdom of value individu-
alism, as List and Pettit themselves suggest and as I will assume from now on. I do 
so both for the sake of simplicity and as an attempt at rapprochement with indi-
vidualists, but also because I believe (though cannot argue here) that even if some 
states have impersonal corporate value, this value is likely insignificant as compared 
with the value of individual interests generally at stake in wars, such as life and 
bodily integrity.
Thus, following List and Pettit, states qua group agents can have irreducible 
rights, but these rights may be lost, or otherwise run out, in virtue of how states 
relate to individuals.23 A state may, for example, have no sovereignty-based 
complaint against various types of external interferences aimed at thwarting its 
21. See especially Jeff McMahan, “What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War?” in The 
Morality of Defensive War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 115–56.
22. Think, for example, of their aesthetic value in the abstract. See further Derek Parfit, Reasons 
and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
23. Incidentally, such value individualist thinking about the relative moral importance of 
states qua group agents goes some way toward addressing Marko Milanovic’s query, which 
Larry May highlights in his contribution to this volume. “If human rights accrue to human 
beings solely by virtue of their humanity,” Milanovic asks, “why should these rights evaporate 
merely because two states [. . .] have engaged in armed conflict?” Insofar as value individualism 
is true, even if states are distinct moral agents with rights of their own, these must always be 
understood in terms of how they serve the rights of individuals, and never as unrelated substi-
tute for them. In other words, human rights remain at the heart of the morality of war, in spite 
of states’ involvement.
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violations of its individual members’ human rights.24 It may also have no justified 
sovereignty-based complaint against some external interferences aimed at averting 
its unjust threats to foreign populations. May we then intelligibly hold that a state 
is, qua corporate entity, liable to such interferences? It seems to me that we may.
II. The Moral Salience of State Corporate Liability to 
Minimally Harmful Targeted Attacks
An important tension here is that a state’s corporate liability to an external inter-
ference does not entail that individuals, who may be harmed in the process, are 
also liable to it. Such individuals may not be morally responsible in any way for 
the unjust threat that gives rise to their state’s liability. Neither may they be caus-
ally responsible or culpable for it, or even beneficiaries of it. Still, this objection is 
contingent. Some external interferences aimed at averting a state’s unjust threat 
may be sufficiently well tailored to impact only what is irreducibly the state’s 
own—namely its decisions, plans, policies, and their materialization—without 
harming individuals, or only occasioning negligibly small harm to them. Think of 
some sufficiently well-designed arms embargoes geared at thwarting a state’s ag-
gressive intentions. Or consider foreign tanks temporarily crossing an aggressive 
state’s border, or military aircrafts flying into its airspace, in a preventive show 
of force. Think also of more invasive targeted bombings of unmanned weapons-
storage or missile-launching facilities, or of empty military airport runways soon 
to be harnessed for unjust offensives. All else being equal,25 state corporate liabil-
ity to such incapacitating or otherwise preventive interferences—which, note, 
include attacks—may not only be intelligible, but also morally unproblematic.
An important payoff of recognizing the possibility of such liability is tied to 
the eventuality that a state’s unjust threat may emanate from an irreducible decision. 
Remember the kind of multi-premise majority decision-making discussed above. 
Imagine that, when votes on successive issues are aggregated, they yield a corpo-
rate plan to launch an immediate unjust offensive that no individual actually en-
dorses. Imagine further that no individuals, either voters or enactors of the states’ 
plan, are sufficiently responsible for it—let alone culpable or benefiting—for their 
liability (assuming they have any) to be determinative of the permissibility of a 
24. For two of many versions of this claim, see Joseph Raz, “Human Rights without Foundations,” 
in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 321–37; Christopher Heath Wellman, “Debate: Taking 
Human Rights Seriously,” Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (2012): 119–30.
25. By this I mean, in part, that harm to individuals occasioned by the interference would be, 
at most, negligibly small.
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circumscribed yet necessary preventive attack of the kind just suggested. In such 
limited cases, their state’s liability to attack might ground the relevant permission.
Some may be tempted to recharacterize this permission in terms of a liability-
less “lesser evil” justification—say, because bombing the would-be aggressor state’s 
military runway or weapons-storage facility would save many lives. This view has 
the appeal of simplicity. However, I believe there are at least two reasons why the 
possibility of morally salient state corporate liability should not be discarded. 
First, it will not always be unambiguous that bombing unmanned runways or 
storage facilities is a lesser evil. It may not be if, for example, such defensive bomb-
ings are carried out to prevent the unjust destruction of military installations or 
other state property whose value is, all things considered, not obviously greater. 
In such situations, state corporate liability may be a morally salient fact that helps 
fix the parameters of permissible preventive attacks on the unjustly threatening 
state. Second, lesser evil reasoning may be articulated without any attention to 
the involvement of irreducible state agency in the creation of unjust threats. 
Insofar as a group agent is, in fact, a source of such threats, and such behavior af-
fects its moral standing, subtler moral reasoning that reflects it is likely preferable.
Others, still, may question the point of recognizing state corporate liability 
from the angle of redundancy. They may contend that the voters and enactors 
of the state’s unjust threat in my scenario have really brought this threat about 
jointly, irrespective of whether their actions ultimately translated into those of an 
irreducible corporate agent. If, indeed, they are jointly responsible for the threat, 
they may also be jointly liable for it. Could such joint liability not play the limited 
demarcation role that I have so far been ascribing to state corporate liability, in 
relation to non-harmful attacks on military facilities? Here are some grounds for 
doubting it. First, to be successful, this move would require a sound account of 
how the joint liability of some individual decision-makers and enactors implies 
the permissibility of destroying state property. Even if such an account can be pro-
vided—say, through arguments from representation or trusteeship—joint liabil-
ity may still not exhaust the space of state corporate liability. By hypothesis, 
no individual voter in my scenario intended the unjust threat, and all may have 
 actively opposed it. Thus, it is hard to conceive of such voters as intending or de-
siring that they together bring about the unjust threat, a condition commonly 
deemed necessary for non-corporate joint action and responsibility.26 Assuming 
26. See, e.g., Michael Bratman, “Shared Agency,” in Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical 
Theory and Scientific Practice, ed. Chris Mantzavinos (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 41–59; Philip Pettit and David Schweikard, “Joint Actions and Group Agents,” 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2006): 18–39. One may wonder whether voters intending 
or desiring that they together bring about a decision on a given set of issues is sufficient to 
ground their joint agency and responsibility in respect of what is actually decided. While I 
doubt it, I cannot provide a defense here.
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that no one vote would have made a difference, there may also be relevant issues 
of causal overdetermination in respect of each voter. Let us also stipulate that 
none of them would benefit from the threat in any significant way. Finally, for the 
sake of simplicity and effective exposition, let us assume that, in the state in ques-
tion, a quick-reaction electronic system is in place to compute the votes and give 
immediate effect to time-sensitive operational military plans such as the one de-
cided upon—say, by initiating, without further human intercession, the targeted 
launch of automated missiles. Though farfetched, this last set of facts avoids mud-
dying the example with distracting questions of individual liability that could 
arise from the responsibility or culpability of enactors of the plan. Along with the 
voting scenario described, this hypothetical specification helps show that, in some 
conceivable though limited cases, state corporate liability might have a morally 
salient role to play.
III. Fleshing Out Individualists’ Powerful General Objection 
to State Corporate Liability
Now, despite what I said in the last section, preventive military action against a 
state will almost always involve the deliberate killing or severe harming of indi-
viduals, on a significant scale. After all, this is what we have commonly come to 
mean by “war”—likely because, most often, it is hard to imagine bringing a state 
to desist from unjust aggressive designs by means of attack without harming at 
least some of its individual members. The key individualist objection to the moral 
salience of state corporate liability in this context can perhaps most clearly be ar-
ticulated in terms of Tadros’s understanding of liability. Underlying my earlier 
description of his account is Tadros’s attempt to meet the nonconsequentialist 
objection against intentionally using—or worse, harmfully using—individuals as 
a means to achieve some good. This important objection is generally defended on 
the basis of individuals’ ultimate value as beings independent from each other, 
who each have an intrinsic right to set their own ends. It is in response to this ob-
jection that Tadros contends that individuals can permissibly be harmfully used 
if they have enforceable duties—and, thus, are liable—to bear harm for the sake 
of some goal. Admittedly, List and Pettit do argue that corporate agents are rela-
tively independent, or autonomous, from their individual members. However, 
nowhere do they even speculate about the possibility of such agents’ ultimate 
valuation; their commitment is to value individualism. Insofar as they are correct 
(or that the impersonal significance of states is comparatively trivial), it would 
seem paradoxical to claim that states qua group agents can have morally salient 
enforceable duties to sustain attacks, when those who are targeted as means of 
enforcement are mostly their individual members, often at the cost of their lives 
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or bodily integrity. Shouldn’t the inquiry be the other way around, focusing in-
stead on ultimately valuable individuals and their liability, as opposed to the lia-
bility of an entity whose value is derivative from theirs (or is otherwise too insig-
nificant to play any salient role)?
The point can also be made in McMahan’s idiom by emphasizing that, while 
it may sometimes be consistent with value individualism for corporate rights 
(and their loss) to take priority over specific individual rights, such prioritization 
is only permissible when it better serves individuals’ interests or good otherwise 
understood. Prioritizing corporate rights and their loss when assessing the per-
missibility of attacks targeting individuals is likely to do precisely the reverse, 
since a state’s forfeiture of sovereignty rights may well not automatically entail 
that targeted individual members also lose their individual rights not to be harmed. 
To know whether they do, we need a more particularized approach to determin-
ing the permissibility of attacks that tracks individuals’ liability and its grounds.
Again, individuals’ liability is not a justificatory panacea. If, as in cases of at-
tacks targeting what is the state’s own, some individual members end up being 
harmed or killed as unintentional side effects, the salient moral question may be 
whether these individuals’ rights could permissibly be overridden, or otherwise 
delimited, for the sake of some intended greater good. I am also not denying the 
possibility that such greater good may sometimes be irreducibly collective in 
nature—think of the value of a just or a solidaristic community—and that it may 
be entwined with the existence of states qua corporate agents. Notice, however, 
that the point about overriding is not a point about liability so much as a point 
about competing values. Nor is the following point so much about states’ corpo-
rate liability as it is about group values and their importance. Given the limited 
focus of my inquiry on state corporate liability, it seems methodologically impor-
tant to keep these distinctions in mind.
Should my conclusion then be that, while state corporate liability to an attack 
may be morally relevant to its permissibility when the attack does not involve 
harm to individuals, or perhaps no significant harm to them, it is irrelevant or, at 
most, overshadowed by individual considerations when it does? List and Pettit’s 
account of corporate agency would not stand in the way of this conclusion. Unlike 
traditionalist collectivist accounts, their argument does not preclude assessments 
of individual liability arising from what individuals do in making state corporate 
agency possible, or otherwise. Thus, some voters in my earlier scenario may have 
intended to bring about the unjust threat, and done everything they could to 
ensure its materialization. Given their actions, not only in voting but also in con-
vincing others, they may, at least partly, have been morally and causally responsi-
ble, even perhaps culpable, for this unjust threat. In light of the importance of the 
threat, they may even have been liable to defensive attack. Military enactors of 
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the threat may, too, have been liable in virtue of their responsible and culpable 
contributions. If that is correct, our next question must then be whether a state’s 
corporate liability can ever add anything salient to the individualist moral picture 
when assessing the permissibility of deadly or significantly harmful attacks in war.
IV. A Limited Democratic Rejoinder?
Could it be, for example, that, in respect of at least some states that meet the 
conditions of group agency, their corporate liability may ground individual 
members’ liability to attack in a general way? The suggestion is not new, although 
some of its more famous articulations blatantly fail to meet the individualists’ 
objection. Think here of Rousseau’s controversial contention that only the dem-
ocratic state remains once the social contract that creates it is entered into by the 
multitude of individuals, such that, by definition, the state’s collective will is also 
the will of each individual member.27 Given this blunt conflation, it is unsurpris-
ing that Rousseau holds that “war is then not a relationship between one man and 
another, but a relationship between one State and another, in which individuals 
are enemies only by accident . . . any State can only have other States, and not men, 
as enemies.”28
There are more nuanced versions of the democratic proposal. For example, in 
his recent work on non-domination, Philip Pettit himself suggests that while a 
state can be a responsible corporate agent in its own right, its individual members 
can also aspire to control it jointly.29 They can aspire to do so in domains in which 
our world’s existing arrangements allow states at least some discretion as to action, 
and in a way that makes individual members’ share in the joint control equal. For 
such equally shared joint control to obtain, a number of conditions must be met. 
Crucially, individual members, enabled by a suitable constitution, must exercise 
equally accessible, unconditioned, and efficacious influence over the state, which 
pushes it to act in a direction equally acceptable to all. The overall claim is that, 
when such conditions are met, individual members actually control their state’s 
will, even if they leave matters of detail to the corporate luck of the draw. This 
argument may have implications for liability. Could we not hold that individual 
members of such a democratic state would have no justified complaints against 
their state being subjected to a bloody attack aimed at preventing its unjust threat, 
27. Rousseau, The Social Contract, I.6, II.12.
28. Rousseau, The Social Contract, I.4.9.
29. Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), chaps. 3–5.
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given that its liability to it must, in a very real sense, also be theirs in an equal 
measure (in virtue of their equal joint control)?
The idea that control of a liable agent entails the controllers’ liability is a mul-
tifaceted one that I cannot unravel here. Instead, let me point out a number of key 
difficulties with the argument that are especially relevant to my inquiry. These 
difficulties exist over and above the obvious criticism that no existing state comes 
even remotely close to meeting Pettit’s desiderata of popular control. In all cur-
rent so-called democracies, popular control is limited and unequally exercised, 
such that control-based generalizations about liability are morally hazardous. 
Still, since Pettit’s conditions are explicitly meant to be achievable, let us take him 
at his word for the sake of argument.30
Note, first, that if a state’s individual members actually control it, and this 
control gives rise to their liability to attack, then the key to the permissibility of 
the attack seems to be their joint individual liability, not their state’s corporate 
liability. As Pettit makes clear, there is a distinction between the unincorporated 
plurality of citizens who jointly seek to control their state, and the state qua self- 
governing singular corporate entity that they may not succeed in controlling.31 If, 
when they do not control their state, they are not liable for its wrongs and, when 
they do control it, they are liable for them, it seems to be their control-derived 
liability, not their state’s liability, that is operative.
Second, the fact that an individual member has as good an opportunity as all 
others to exercise some control over his state does not mean that he actually con-
trols it (or even that he has a consistently effective ability to do so). This point 
holds true even if, as Pettit suggests, there is a system of contestation in place that 
allows individuals to test state decisions for how the process in which they are 
generated respects the value of equal access to influence. For if the state ultimately 
does things that one bitterly and proactively opposes—for example, launches 
unjust military offensives—one must surely regard them as things one does not 
control. Arguably, what Pettit has in mind is joint popular control of the general 
direction of a state’s actions over time, where each individual member might “win 
some” but also “lose some.” However, what if one of my “losses” relates to my state’s 
one-off creation of a serious unjust threat to the population of another state? 
Would my share in the control of my state’s otherwise nonbelligerent direction 
suffice to make me liable to be harmed, and possibly killed, to avert this threat? 
Assuming that I lack any other relevant responsibility, culpability, and so forth, 
for the threat, and would not even benefit from it, it is intuitively doubtful. This, 
30. Ibid., 180.
31. Ibid., 285–88.
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I believe, is because it is such facts about me qua individual that remain morally 
commanding. Our intuitions may be somewhat different when a state’s popu-
larly controlled general direction is one of unjust belligerency. However, even if, 
in such a case, we can accurately say that this direction is controlled by all, my 
earlier point still holds. Joint individual liability may provide all the explanation 
we need.
Note, finally, that Pettit’s control argument is explicitly limited to adult, able-
minded, and more or less permanent residents of democratic states. Children, 
visitors, and those who are genuinely unable to control their state are excluded ab 
initio.32 Therefore, assessments of the permissibility of attacking them must pro-
ceed separately from any general control-based arguments about joint or corpo-
rate liability, if their rights are not to be unduly disregarded.
Then again, I may have unfairly stacked the deck against the relevance of state 
corporate liability to lethal or significantly harmful attacks by focusing on a sug-
gestion that rests on individuals’ actual control. Indeed, a similar worry also arises 
in respect of all arguments grounded in individuals’ voluntary choice to join a 
state or in their actual consent, explicit or tacit, to accept responsibility for its 
actions. Since, typically, not every member of a state will have so chosen or con-
sented, let alone have had a genuine opportunity or otherwise been able to do 
so, individualized assessments would still be called for and ready generalizations 
remain questionable. Notice, however, that this kind of objection may not hold 
as firmly against arguments based on what is sometimes referred to as “necessary 
popular authorization.” If, for example, one were able to argue successfully that 
no individual member could reasonably oppose their corporate state’s actions, 
because they generally could or should not do without them, then it may be pos-
sible to maintain that when the state’s corporate liability is engaged, theirs also is 
ipso facto.
Consider, as a way of orienting our thinking, the following proposal, inspired 
by aspects of the Kantian and broader republican traditions, which I have broken 
down into deliberately rough and suggestive premises. I offer it, without being 
committed to it, as a provocation that may help us see how such an argument 
could unfold:
(1) Justice as individual independence. The ideal of justice corresponds to 
social conditions in which each individual is treated with the respect with 
which she should be treated. According to one prominent version of this 
view, justice prevails when each is treated as an equally valuable independent 
32. Ibid., 138.
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being who may set her own ends for herself, unless she does so in a way that is 
inconsistent with equal independence for all.33
(2) Corporate state agency as required for justice. Given the difficulty of 
bringing about and maintaining such a condition in every relevant aspect of 
individuals’ lives, the coordination of a state qua corporate agent is required. 
Such a state is required for justice, since the many complex, interconnected, and 
dynamic tasks necessary to make it possible could not be discharged by any one 
individual or by an unorganized plurality, even with the assistance of an imper-
sonal apparatus of disciplining rules and routines. The tasks in question include 
establishing and adjusting just laws that, among other things, identify substan-
tive and coherent basic liberties; ensuring that sufficient resources and adequate 
infrastructures are in place to sustain everyone’s independence; protecting 
people against the invasion of their independence, whether in particular rela-
tionships or on a more general front; and so forth. What is needed to discharge 
such tasks is a state (or whatever else one may want to call it) qua collective 
agency, made up of numerous specialized officials and subsidiary agencies, yet 
speaking with a unified voice, acting to a coherent set of ends and, insofar as it 
fails, remaining sensitive to the need to restore harmony. To be effective, this 
state also needs to have the power to secure coercively the order it establishes, as 
well as a recognized claim to exclusive authority to govern it.34
(3) The high value of justice. Justice is extremely valuable given that a life 
lived under the subjection of another’s private will (think of the life of a slave 
or of an ongoing victim of torture), or even the ongoing threat of subjection 
to it (think of life in the state of nature), is a critically impoverished life.35
(4) Individual members’ stringent duty of justice to support and own up to 
the state’s endeavors. Therefore, for their own sake and the sake of others, indi-
vidual members of a reasonably just corporate state all have a stringent (and, 
arguably, enforceable) duty to support its endeavors, plausibly at considerable 
costs to themselves. They have such a duty insofar as their state’s interpreta-
tion and rendering of justice is reasonable. This last proviso is necessary since 
reasonable mistakes are an inevitable concomitant of moral agency in our 
world, and the value of a reasonable approximation of justice may more than 
make up for such deviations.
When such a reasonably just state launches an unjust offensive against another state 
on the mistaken, yet understandable assumption that it is necessary to defend its 
33. For a detailed articulation of this view, see Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s 
Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).
34. For a defense of this position, see Pettit, On the People’s Terms, esp. 132–36.
35. Again, see Ripstein, Force and Freedom.
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internal order and individual members, the argument so far may seem to invite 
the conclusion that the latter are liable to share in the costs. While their state 
may clearly be deprived of a right against forceful interference as a result of the 
offensive, they, too, as a result, may generally be deprived of their right against 
attack. They may be so deprived on account of their duty to support and own 
up to their state as an enabler of justice, when it succeeds as much as when it rea-
sonably errs.
Interestingly, those who otherwise defend state corporate liability on similar 
lines tend to deny, often without saying much more, that the kind of argument 
considered can successfully ground a general liability as severe as a liability to 
harmful attacks.36 Why? One might think that, on its own, the general duty to 
support the conditions of justice—in the form of a state qua corporate agent—is 
not sufficiently important to ground a general liability to be killed or seriously 
wounded. Indeed, recall that, by hypothesis, individual members may not have 
consented to (or been able to consent), voluntarily affirmed, or otherwise identi-
fied with the state or its wrongdoing, and may not have had any responsibility for 
or culpable connection to the existence or subsistence of either. Still, is it really so 
implausible to think that justice, itself so valuable to human life in society, can, at 
least sometimes, be sufficiently important on its own to ground individuals’ gen-
eral liability to attack—whether the value is understood as in (1) or, expansively, 
to include the coordination and distribution of resources with a view to elevating 
individuals beyond minimally decent conditions of well-being, or even as also 
having some impersonal value? Furthermore, even if justice so understood is not 
sufficiently important on its own, could it not be so, at least sometimes, when 
coupled with other important public goods the realization of which depends on 
states’ corporate agency?37
The key point to make here is that, even if a plausible argument to this effect 
could be developed, other even more formidable obstacles stand in the way of the 
line of argument considered. One relates to the premise that, in today’s world, 
justice and other relevant values depend for their realization on the corporate 
agency of organizations akin to those I have been referring to as corporate states. 
36. See especially Anna Stilz, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 19 (2011): 190–208. At one point, Stilz seems to claim that individual state 
members cannot permissibly be harmfully targeted in response to their state’s harmful 
wrongdoing insofar as they are not individually to blame for it. As we have seen, though, 
blameworthiness tends not to be regarded as a condition sine qua non of liability to attack. 
On the state being constitutive of what justice requires, see further Anna Stilz, “Authority, 
Self-Determination, and Community in Cosmopolitan War,” Law and Philosophy 33 (2014): 
309–35.
37. Cf. John M. Parrish, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” International Theory 
1 (2009): 119–54.
Dictionary: NOAD0002861659.INDD   135 9/30/2016   10:51:48 AM
1 3 6  •  t h e  e t h i c s  o f  wa r
If, alternatively, an individual Hobbesian-like sovereign or, say, individuals acting 
through states (or other organizations) with no corporate agency of their own 
can realize these values, or if no organizations whatsoever are required to realize 
them, then the part of the argument that rests on state corporate agency becomes 
superfluous. In other words, the argument may only be misleadingly tethered to 
the corporate idea with which I have been concerned. Individuals’ general liabil-
ity to attack may still arise, at least in part, from their membership in a given state, 
but contentions to this effect might then be able to sidestep altogether the corpo-
rate question.38
In the end, though, even if a claim about state corporate agency and justice 
like the one in (2) can withstand close scrutiny, an even more germane objection 
remains: is the line of argument considered really one about state corporate liabil-
ity at all? Is it not instead an argument about when state corporate injustice 
or other relevant state action may partake in grounding individuals’ liability to 
attack? Arguably, (4) betrays this fact by suggesting that if state corporate liability 
ipso facto engages individual members’ liability, it is because they have a strong 
and potentially enforceable duty to support and own up to the endeavors of their 
reasonably just state. The question then arises of whether the idea of state corpo-
rate liability to attack does any salient moral work, over and above its tracking of 
individuals’ liability. While, as I suggested earlier, the answer may sometimes be 
affirmative in cases where individuals are not at risk of being significantly harmed 
by an attack on the liable state, the reverse seems to be true when significant indi-
vidual harm is at stake. In such contexts, even if state corporate agency may con-
stitute an important premise in liability assessments (say, as an alleged condition 
of justice), it is individuals’ duties and rights that seem to remain commanding—
just as individualist theorists claim they should be.
This worry may well be fatal to the prospects of a salient moral category of 
state corporate liability to (most) attacks in war. Compound it with the other 
controversies mentioned, as well as with the fact that the line of argument consid-
ered is strictly limited to states of a certain type (i.e., reasonably just corporate 
states), and the relevance of the category seems ever more questionable (at least 
when significant harm to individuals is at stake). Could this conclusion be the 
price to pay for accepting individualists’ core insight against Just War traditional-
ists, and for refraining from departing from value individualism in unacceptably 
radical ways? I am tempted to think it is.
38. Prominent arguments adopting this strategy include Frances Kamm, “Failures of Just War 
Theory,” in The Moral Target: Aiming at Right Conduct in War and Other Conflicts (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 36–80, at 64–72; Tadros, “Duty and Liability,” 271–77.
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Conclusion: The Wider Relevance of State Corporate Agency
Thus, even if it is intelligible and may otherwise be morally useful, the idea of 
state corporate liability seems, at most, of very limited relevance to the morality 
of war. This conclusion will likely please many individualist theorists—including 
those who think that, although it matters that wars are not fought by lone indi-
viduals but groups of them, individualist concepts such as individual complicity, 
vicarious individual liability, individual associative duties, and joint individual 
liability are sufficient to account for attendant moral complexities. Still, even if 
my conclusion and analysis are correct, these theorists should not be too quick to 
claim victory. State corporate agency and responsibility may still have an impor-
tant role to play in the morality of war. An important upshot of my discussion, 
I believe, is that it not only helps identify what this role is not, but also orient 
where we should look next.
For one thing, if, as queried above, some values of great importance can 
only be realized through the intercession of corporate agents, such values may 
ground important duties in individuals to constitute, support, and influence 
these agents—and correspondingly limit these individuals’ rights. Insofar as the 
said duties are enforceable, the question may then be asked whether they may be 
enforced through attacks in war. Here, the issue is clearly one of individual liabil-
ity, as opposed to corporate liability, but it remains intrinsically connected to the 
possibility and value of corporate agency. The line of argument sketched in the 
previous section is only one of many conceivable arguments that merit further 
exploration along such lines.39
Furthermore, if states qua corporate agents can perpetrate wrongs that are 
distinctively their own, then a question arises as to whether individuals may par-
ticipate in such wrongs in ways that enhance their individual liability. The sugges-
tion is sometimes encountered that individuals’ wrongful complicity in corporate 
wrongdoing can be distinct from wrongs these individuals perpetrate as princi-
pals, when contributing to corporate agents’ decisions and their implementation.40 
No doubt, even if this suggestion is correct, some difficult work remains to be 
done about how to differentiate properly accomplice from principal wrongdoing, 
especially in the context of single individual actions enacting corporate decisions. 
39. Much insightful work on individuals’ duties tied to the possibility of corporate agents 
is currently being developed, and may usefully be applied to the Just War theory context. See 
especially Stephanie Collins, “Collectives’ Duties and Collectivization Duties,” Australian 
Journal of Philosophy (2012): 1–18.
40. On such “organizational complicity,” see Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin, On 
Complicity and Compromise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chap. 7. See also Anders 
Strand, “Group Agency, Responsibility, and Control.”
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For example, could a soldier’s murder of an enemy at gunpoint double up as an 
act of complicity in a wider state aggression, and could his or her liability to 
attack be impacted as a result?
Such further paths of inquiry contingent on the possibility of state corporate 
agency are tantalizing, and hold the promise of a more fruitful integration of a 
salient corporate dimension in the morality of war. Of course, insofar as individu-
alized considerations can best account for the puzzles raised here, or if the ideas 
of corporate agency and corporate responsibility ultimately turn out to be mis-
taken, then the inquiry will inevitably be of limited value. Since the jury is still 
out, though, I hope to have helped provide at least some focus for further investi-
gations.
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